An ethical proof-of-authority blockchain framework for anti-corruption in public grant disbursement and fundraising: a multi-level governance and threat-modelled approach

Abstract

Introduction:

Public-sector grant disbursement and fundraising systems are vulnerable to corruption due to limited transparency, weak auditability, unauthorized approvals, and poor traceability of financial transactions. This study proposes a blockchain-based framework to improve accountability and monitoring in public financial management.

Methods:

An Ethereum-compatible ERC-20 test network was used to develop a blockchain-enabled architecture integrating smart contracts, decentralized application (DApp) components, and a Proof-of-Authority (PoA)-based governance mechanism. The framework was evaluated using simulation-based testing, transaction validation scenarios, corruption-detection workflows, and indicative gas-cost analysis under controlled conditions.

Results:

The proposed framework enabled tamper-resistant audit trails, timestamping, and end-to-end traceability of grant transactions. A hierarchical governance model incorporating multi-level institutional approvals reduced unilateral control and improved transaction accountability. Simulation-based evaluation demonstrated improved transparency, auditability, and transaction monitoring efficiency, while maintaining relatively low indicative gas costs.

Discussion:

The findings suggest that blockchain-supported governance mechanisms may strengthen transparency and accountability in public-sector financial systems under controlled conditions. The proposed framework demonstrates the potential of combining institutional governance structures with blockchain-based validation to support secure and traceable grant management and fundraising processes.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and problem context

Corruption is one of the most persistent structural challenges to governance, economic growth, and public trust and confidence especially in developing economies like Pakistan (Shaikh and Khan, 2023). Pakistan is ranked 135th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (as of 2025), highlighting the severity of governance-related challenges (Trading, 2025). Although traditional corrective mechanisms have been applied, such as manual auditing, compliance reporting, and policy monitoring, these strategies have not been effective enough since there has been delayed information disclosure, fragmented record systems, concentration of decision making authority and limited citizen oversight (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Dogar, 2017; Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018). As a result, corruption has become a deeply rooted institutional phenomenon that extends across governance hierarchies.

Furthermore, corruption is particularly evident in the field of public financial management when it comes to the process of grant disbursement and funds raising where it is manifested in falsified records of beneficiaries, fund diversion, over-allocation, procedural manipulation and unauthorized approvals (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Dogar, 2017). Moreover, the lack of real time monitoring systems and verifiable audit trails further amplify these weaknesses as it is realistically hard to identify discrepancies before money ends up being misused (Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018). Consequently, the financial systems of the public sector fail in most cases to promote transparency, accountability, and effective resource allocation, which ultimately leads to poor socio-economic development (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017; Choudrie et al., 2017).

However, blockchain technology has become a promising solution to these restrictions because it allows secure, immutable and transparent recording of transactions (Nakamoto, 2008; Shaikh et al., 2025). Its decentralised ledger system guarantees that no one can modify financial records in the ledger, and smart contracts are responsible for executing rules and set of instructions without the involvement of intermediaries (Atzori, 2015; Garcia, 2021). These capabilities have seen a growing use of blockchain in a financial governance setting, where blockchain is applied to enhance transparency, minimise transaction costs and institutional accountability (Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Nakamoto, 2008; Shaikh et al., 2025; Zbinden and Kondova, 2019; El et al., 2023).

Additionally, the relevance of this approach is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the current workflow of the processes of public fundraising and grant disbursement. The architecture demonstrates the combination of funds contributed by the public, private and citizen groups into a centralized pool of funds and then distributed by government controlled means. However, these systems do not provide verifiable money trails and transparency throughout the funding lifecycle, which means that these systems are less trusted by people and that they are more prone to corruption (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017).

FIGURE 1

1.2 Research gap and theoretical positioning

Although there have been remarkable developments in research on blockchain, the current literature is fragmented and limited in its scope on the topic of corruption in the system of public finances. Simultaneously, some individual applications like procurement transparency, crowdfunding systems, or overall financial traceability were already developed in the past but the focus of those studies was mainly on isolated applications without considering how these elements can be incorporated into a unified framework based on governance (Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Navadkar et al., 2018; Akaba et al., 2020). In addition, the majority of these past methods focused on technical strengths and did not consider the modelling of corruption-specific threats, top-bottom institutional justification, or practical public financial processes.

Theoretically, corruption of public financial systems may be explained by the Principal-Agency Theory, in which the lack of information between the governing institutions (agents) and citizens (principals) creates possibilities of misusing funds (Kuropatkina, 2025; Celestin and Mishra, 2025). Similarly, the Institutional Trust Theory emphasizes transparency, accountability and verifiable processes in regaining people trust in the systems of governance (Jimenez-Castillo, 2026). However, the current blockchain-based solutions fail to sufficiently reflect these theoretical principles into system design, which restricts their implementation in the complicated governance context.

Moreover, the contribution of organized authority-based consent mechanisms, including Proof-of-Authority (PoA), is underutilized in multi-level public governance settings. PoA assigns validation authority to identifiable blockchain nodes, which can be mapped to institutional entities to support accountability and traceability. Additionally, the current literature lacks enough documents addressing how PoA may be incorporated into the hierarchical forms of governance to decrease unilateral control, collusion, and institutional accountability.

Furthermore, prior research rarely evaluates transparency, cost-efficiency, and governance accountability as a single integrated system, as well as do not integrate corruption threat modelling with blockchain-based validation (Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Navadkar et al., 2018; Akaba et al., 2020). This limitation highlights a critical research gap in developing a comprehensive institution-based model that can deal with corruption at the entire lifecycle of the public financial processes.

Finally, the proposed blockchain-based framework addresses these challenges by developing on previous research adapting PoA-based blockchain systems, specifically those that have shown efficiency in terms of cost-security-institutional trust balance by utilizing and implementing this model of governance to corruption-related contexts of public financial conditions (Shaikh et al., 2025).

1.3 Research objectives and contributions

Finally, unlike conventional blockchain governance models, the proposed framework introduces a hierarchical, institution-aligned PoA consensus mechanism, where accountability is directly embedded into the validation process, which makes blockchain governance not a technical paradigm but an institutional governance model.

1.4 Significance of blockchain and PoA in public financial governance

Conventional methods of handling the public funds are based on centralized infrastructures that are quite vulnerable to manipulations, delayed reporting, unauthorized modification and selective disclosure (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017; Mohite and Acharya, 2018; Nguyen, 2016). These weaknesses allow those in authority to bypass the procedural measures, manipulate the financial statements, and steal funds without being discovered quickly, thus making corruption and mismanagement of finances even more prone (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Trading, 2025; Dogar, 2017; Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Garcia, 2021; Lin and Liao, 2017).

However, the blockchain technology directly overcomes these constraints by offering a secure, immutable, and transparent registry in which all financial transactions are stored permanently and time-stamped (Nakamoto, 2008; Shaikh et al., 2025). When the data is stored into the blockchain, it cannot be modified (immutability), so all financial flows can be completely tracked and audited (Kim and Kang, 2021; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Garcia, 2021). Furthermore, smart contracts also contribute to better governance through the automation of important operations like fund allocation, approval rules, and access controls, which can reduce the reliance on human discretion and intervention (Shaikh et al., 2025; Zarir et al., 2021).

Moreover, this structure is enhanced by the integration of Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus, which presents identifiable validators that carry out the process of approving transactions (Shaikh et al., 2025). The cryptographic linking of each validation decision with a given authority makes them accountable and allows tracing governance activities completely (Shaikh et al., 2025). Multiple validators also mitigate the risk of collusion and allow decisions to be made unilaterally, and PoA is specifically applicable to hierarchical public financial systems (Shaikh et al., 2025).

Figure 2 illustrates this mechanism by providing the end-to-end architecture of the proposed blockchain-based framework. The system incorporates fundraising, grant initialization, PoA-based validation, and final disbursement in a single workflow. The donor contributions are entered on-chain, and the grant requests are authenticated by multi-level (PoA) authority consensus and then written on the blockchain. The hybrid storage solution, which consists of blockchain to store the key records and MySQL to store non-sensitive data, is the best way to have a performance-optimal system and the integrity of data stored in a cost-effective manner.

FIGURE 2

Finally, the proposed framework is an important improvement over the conventional systems of financial governance as it incorporates both decentralised transparency and systematised institutional validation. Additionally, this would also allow development of corruption-resistant architecture which would increase accountability, efficiency in resource allocation, and overall trust of the people in government financial activities.

Based on the identified research gap, the following section reviews existing literature to critically analyse current approaches and highlight their limitations in addressing corruption in public financial systems.

2 Related work

2.1 Overview of existing work

Blockchain as a tool to increase transparency and decrease corruption in public sector systems has been studied extensively in previous studies. Akaba et al. identified the major flaws in government procurement such as the low level of transparency, the elaborate process and the deficient stakeholder confidence, suggesting the implementation of the blockchain-based architecture with the participation of the citizens, but the study was limited to the national context, not taking into consideration the cost-effectiveness factor, and not covering the issue of blockchain security weaknesses adequately (Akaba et al., 2020). Likewise, Kim and Kang showed blockchain potential to counter corruption by having immutable and traceable transactions but found that implementation costs and governance risks were significant obstacles to its adoption (Kim and Kang, 2021).

Navadkar et al. highlighted the importance of blockchain in enhancing government operations by improving them via decentralization, transparency and secure histories of transactions, but they observed that implementing this is challenging due to the complexity of infrastructures and financial investments (Navadkar et al., 2018). Aras and Kulkarni also discussed blockchain consensus mechanisms and found useful transparency advantages, but also noted such challenges as regulatory ambiguity, energy usage, and institutional unacceptability (Aras and Kulkarni, 2017). The system suggested by Deshpande et al. a decentralized tender monitoring system proved to be more transparent in procurement, but its feasibility in practice still depends on the institutional-scale support and the availability of infrastructure (Deshpande et al., 2020).

There are several studies that applied blockchain solutions to industry-relevant cases of corruption. Tariq et al. discussed the problem of credential fraud by developing blockchain-based academic verifications, whereas Niya et al. examined decentralized scientific publishing platforms as the solution to the problem of exploitation in academic ecosystems (Tariq et al., 2022; Niya et al., 2019). Nor et al. suggested the schemes of disaster crowdfunding with blockchain applications to enhance transparency and minimize misappropriation of funds, but the issues of long-term scalability are still obvious (Nor, 2017).

Regardless of these developments, the literature available often lacks unified frameworks where corruption-focused threat modelling, authority-based validation, governance hierarchy, cost-efficiency, and ethical oversight are put in a single architectural framework of the public financial systems. This inconsistency supports the rationale of a formal, institution-focused blockchain-based solution specific to grant disbursement and public fundraising settings.

2.2 Summary and analysis

Conventional funding sources, including government grants, bank loans, and other conventional crowdfunding sites, continue to rely heavily on centralized intermediaries, bureaucracy of processes, and low-level transparency (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017). Although such tools as Kickstarter or GoFundMe have enhanced the contribution of ordinary people, they have systematic drawbacks, trace of finances, platform commissions, and susceptibility to misuse, so both donors and beneficiaries remain uncertain and at risk of financial losses (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017; Onginjo et al., 2021).

Moreover, the overall success of crowdfunding campaigns is uneven, and many of them fail because of low levels of visibility, lack of trust, and poor systems of accountability (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017). The restrictions point to a fundamental inefficiency of traditional fundraising models, where the lack of transparency behind financial flows and real-time verification that donor trust is compromised (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017).

Crowdfunding on blockchain creates a paradigm shift, through which it is possible to enable decentralized, transparent, and tamper-resistant flows of transactions (Nor, 2017; Shaikh et al., 2025). Blockchain enhances transparency and responsibility by tracking all financial transactions on an unchangeable ledger and makes it visible at any given time, starting at the start of funds and up to their point of disbursement (Nor, 2017; Shaikh et al., 2025; Mohite and Acharya, 2018). Websites like OpenLedger and Stratis show how blockchain-based Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and decentralized capital markets can establish new lines in secure capital mobilization and introduce accountability to governance frameworks (Hartmann et al., 2019; Nor, 2017; Zbinden and Kondova, 2019; Onginjo et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2019).

Furthermore, another innovation unique to blockchain-based fundraising is the adoption of multi-party access control (Proof of Authority), in which multiple authorized parties must verify access to funds, which builds collective responsibility and deters personal abuse (Shaikh et al., 2025). The ethical and transparent layer that this structural system of governance presents that is lacking in traditional models builds stronger trust in the parties concerned and establishes greater financial integrity (Shaikh et al., 2025).

Figure 3 illustrates the system-level architecture of all the stakeholder entities involved in the proposed PoA-based corruption-resistant financial structure. The diagram illustrates the relationship between the government, public agencies, private organizations, donors, PoA consensus validators, the monitoring bodies, and the learning institutions in the ecosystem. Every stakeholder plays a well-defined operational or governance role, creating a multi-layer architecture that facilitates transparency and decentralized validation and full traceability of funds. This framework shows the way the suggested system combines top-down control and bottom-up accountability to mitigate unauthorized approvals, fund diversion, and fraudulent allocations throughout the grant and fundraising process.

FIGURE 3

In conclusion, this proposed blockchain-based grant and fundraising system has significant benefits over conventional ones, as their combination of transparency, accountability, decentralisation, and automation makes them more robust to corruption and more responsive to contemporary governance needs.

The limitations identified in existing approaches directly inform the design of the proposed blockchain-based framework, which is presented in the following Methodology section.

3 Methodology and system implementation

The proposed research is based on design science research (DSR), where a prototype blockchain-based system is developed and tested in controlled simulation settings to evaluate its efficiency in improving transparency and identifying corruption-related abnormalities in the financial processes of the public (Taufiq et al., 2025).

Furthermore, this section describes a blockchain-based system in depth that will provide transparency, accountability, and tamper resistance in disbursement and fundraising processes in granting publicly and in fundraising activities. It uses an Ethereum-compatible network to implement the system and uses ERC-20-compatible smart contracts to model and monitor the lifecycle of public funds. It has a Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus layer that is incorporated to verify authenticated institutional actors (e.g., funding bodies, auditors and regulatory authorities), so that only verified participants can initiate, approve, and validate financial transactions.

Furthermore, a prototype of a web-based application is created to communicate with the deployed smart contracts on a test network, so that decentralised grant allocation, transfer, and verification processes could be performed. The application is built with the use of web3.js libraries to ensure a safe communication between user interface and blockchain layer and is used to manage identities, sign transactions, and implement role-based access control through the use of MetaMask. This architecture enables auditable, immutable accounting of funds whilst maintaining institutional governance by PoA model.

3.1 Architectural design and system framework

This system is developed as a blockchain-based system of governance that will help to mitigate the issue of corruption in the government grant disbursement and public fundraising process supporting transparency, traceability, and validation by authorities. The architecture is built on a test network of Ethereum ERC-20 and smart contract, decentralized application (DApp), and a Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus system to control the flow of funds between the government and end beneficiaries. The framework will be split into two major functional modules: Grant Disbursement Module and Fundraising Module.

These modules operate on a unified blockchain foundation where all financial transactions are cryptographically encoded, time-stamped and stored in an unalterable registry. The architecture is specifically aimed at managing the money trail of government-allocated funds by imposing conditional commitments of transaction that must be authorized formally and permitted to execute finally.

There are four key stakeholders that are considered as the system architecture. Governmental agencies are the key initiators that grant money and provide the official sources of funds. The developers are the public and private institutions which apply and receive these grants in their development programs. Citizens are contributors and they make voluntary donations which are contributed towards the fundraising pot. Monitoring and accreditation are done through PoA consensus validators which result in approval or disapproval of a transaction to ensure transparency and reduce corruption.

3.2 Proof-of-authority governance mechanism

A Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus algorithm is used to achieve controlled decentralization and to avoid arbitrary manipulation. PoA allows only government-authorized entities to validate transactions, unlike the traditional Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake systems, where the validators are trusted entities. In this simulation, institutional authorities are represented using Education Ministers (EM) as a conceptual example.

Furthermore, the governance-level approval should be differentiated with blockchain consensus. Under the proposed system, at the application layer, transactions are evaluated and approved by designated institutional authorities at the application layer, and at the blockchain layer, Proof-of-Authority (PoA) is used to validate and permanently record transactions. This separation ensures both institutional accountability and technical integrity.

The approval function of determining the final decision is as follows:

Where EMᵢ ∈ {0,1} represents the decision of the ith authority (1 = approve, 0 = reject), and n denotes the total number of validators (blockchain nodes).

Only with an approval score of 0.66 (or higher, the majority consensus) is a grant approved. This PoA structure (see Figure 4) is odd and so there are no tie cases, and the result of the decision is deterministic. The logic of design follows the logic of authority-balance that has been developed in previous PoA implementations in critical governance contexts and confirms its suitability in reducing the centralization of risk and eliminating unilateral control.

FIGURE 4

Proof-of-Authority (PoA) is the blockchain consensus mechanism in the proposed system that will determine which authorized nodes are allowed to validate transactions. Conversely, the PoA approval is done at the application layer with specific authorities reviewing grant applications. The result of PoA consensus decision is then forwarded to the blockchain block where this consensus has been used in ensuring that the decision is securely validated and recorded.

3.3 Transaction processing and smart contract logic

Every transactional interaction in the system is controlled by smart contracts coded in Solidity. These types of contracts introduce conditional logic of execution that funds are not allowed to be transferred, or disbursed, before PoA validation is successfully accomplished.

All transactions within the proposed framework have an organized implementation pipeline. The government, first, determines the amount of the grants, and allocates it to a given program. It is followed by the system producing a formal request to disburse the payment that is broadcast via the DApp to the appropriate authorities. The request is evaluated one by one by institutional authorities at the application layer, after which validated transactions are recorded through PoA consensus on the blockchain. Transactions that can survive through this consensus level are only written into the blockchain, so that the record book only has validated and corruption-free financial transactions.

The pseudo-code of the proposed framework is as follows:

Figure 5 shows the authentication process of the authorised stakeholders in the system of grant disbursement. The pseudocode specifies the initialisation of user credentials, verification of user role, and validation of secure user login provided through cryptographic hashes. Role-based access control will ensure that only identified institutional participants (e.g., funding authorities or regulatory bodies) get registered and logged in to avoid multiple and unauthorized participation.

FIGURE 5

The process of making new grant records on the blockchain is shown in Figure 6. The algorithm grabs the identifiers of grants, amount of funding, roles of the user, digital signatures, and the status of approvals after attaching the transaction to the distributed ledger. This is being done to make sure that every action concerning grants is permanent and can be tracked down by the authority which initiated them.

FIGURE 6

Figure 7 is used to explain Proof-of-Authority consensus mechanism used to grant transactions. All grants are validated by the institutional authorities, and agreement outcomes are stored on chain. The pseudocode indicates that PoA identifiers, validation result, and cryptographic hashes are stored to make them accountable and unable to be manipulated.

FIGURE 7

Figure 8 describes the validation logic of determining grant availability through PoA consensus results. Progression is only approved on a grant once the set majority requirement (e.g., two out of three authorities) has been met. This mechanism imposes non-individual decision-making and reduces threats posed by the abuse of authority or collusion within an individual.

FIGURE 8

Figure 9 illustrates the last phase of grant lifecycle that is the decision. According to the validated PoA consensus outputs, every grant is definitively stamped on as accepted or discarded, and the result is indefinitely deposited on the blockchain. This step will enable end-to-end transparency, and it will have an auditable record of funding decisions.

FIGURE 9

Furthermore, to maximize performance and minimize operational costs, blockchain is not used as a complete data repository by the system. Alternatively, a MySQL database is used to store non-critical transactional metadata, with records of cryptographic significance (like transaction hashes, approval states, and time stamps) being on chain. This is a hybrid storage approach that reduces the consumption of gas and ensures the integrity of data.

3.4 Grant disbursement workflow (use case I)

The government uses its financial resources in the grant disbursement process whereby HEC allocates the funds to the universities where they disburse grants to fund research and development projects in the universities like the Ignite Program. Moreover, a university is PoA-validated when it puts in a grant request. In case it is accepted, the blockchain logs such a transaction using encrypted identifiers such as: Grant amount, Program name, Transaction hash, Authority signatures, and Approval status.

3.5 Fundraising workflow (use case II)

The fund-raising module enables government to develop donor pools towards certain projects like emergency funds or education development projects (see Figure 10). The citizens make the donations through web-based system and to track the proper use of the funds, institutional authorities monitor the contributions. Descriptive campaign data is stored locally, and transactions and donors are verified and traced on blockchain.

FIGURE 10

3.6 Corruption detection logic (use case III)

To ensure that the system exercises consistency of transactions, it compares values allocated in grants with the values disbursed. Any deviation results in PoA rejection and indicates the transaction to be corrupt as shown below in Figures 11, 12.

FIGURE 11

FIGURE 12

3.7 MetaMask wallet integration with web application

MetaMask was incorporated into the web application via Web3.js to facilitate secure citizen and authority interaction with the blockchain-based system, which interacts with the ERC-20 test network directly (see Figure 13). This allows users to issue, sign and verify transactions via a cryptographically secured wallet interface with real-time transparency and traceability. Furthermore, MetaMask is the authorization and execution gateway of all financial operations, such as grant disbursement authorization, and donations to the populace. The interface itself displays the roles, transaction roles, and the approval status in the Proof-of-Authority mechanism in a graphic manner. The interaction between these institutional authorities, donors, and administrators is based on strictly separated layers of permissions that are realized with the help of smart contracts. Moreover, the transaction chain perspective shown in the interface allows the concerned parties to track the life cycle of every fund transfer, starting with its initiation up to PoA validation and final ledger commitment. This ensures that no transaction can be made quietly or without institutional controls and the chances of funds diversion or manipulation are minimal.

FIGURE 13

The MetaMask-driven interface of a transaction confirmation (in Figure 14) is applied to confirm grant-related activities in the blockchain-based grant management system. The interface shows the unchangeable grant history, such as grant identifiers, the total and disbursed amount, address of the owner of the transaction, and the status of the validation. Every transaction needs to be confirmed by a user via MetaMask prior to being sent to the blockchain with cryptographic signing, user accountability, and safeguard against unauthorised or manipulated grant disbursement procedures.

FIGURE 14

3.8 Experimental design and simulation setup

The experimental design is based on a controlled simulation environment that is provided through a private Ethereum-compatible test network (Ganache). The system integrates ERC-20 based smart contracts, interaction of MetaMask wallet which is based on Web3.js for communication. Furthermore, a hybrid storage architecture is used which is based on the combination of the blockchain and MySQL databases.

Moreover, these transactions are performed via the web-based decentralised application (DApp) that allows interacting with the blockchain network in real-time. Simulation environment enables testing of the financial workflows (i.e., grant allocation, validation and disbursement) without external interference. This experimental environment allows transaction behaviour, validation results, and system performance under predefined operational conditions.

3.9 Evaluation scenarios

These scenarios allow the systematic analysis of the possibility of the framework to discriminate between legitimate and corrupt transactions.

3.10 Robustness and stress testing

To measure the robustness of the system, some further stress-testing scenarios were added. These are fraud scenarios that are simulated like the incompatibility of disbursement values, unauthorized transactions, manipulated approval inputs. Furthermore, the system was evaluated in terms of the capability to identify and deny such anomalies under PoA validation mechanism.

In addition, a conceptual collusion scenario was also taken into consideration to examine the strength of the multi-level PoA structure. Although, full collusion testing is outside the reach of the simulation environment. However, the requirement to have majority of the authorities reach an agreement decreases the probability of manipulation by a single individual and enhances the resistance to collusive abuse.

3.11 Verification and validation strategy

A simulation-based testing method was applied to the framework on the Ethereum test network, with controlled transactions conducted with Ganache. Validation emphasized the correctness, uniformity, and integrity of financial records on PoA consensus terms (Shaikh et al., 2025). The system was evaluated with simulated grant and donation information to assess the effectiveness of the framework in averting unauthorized disbursement. However, the communication between the user interface with the blockchain network was developed through the RESTful API calls by both the GET and POST methods, which facilitated real-time synchronization of the decision to make approvals and the transaction logs. Furthermore, over the PoA protocol, three approvals are required per transaction, prior to committing it to the ledger. After validation, all the necessary transaction data such as hash ID, timestamp and the identity of the person who did the transaction were immutably stored and thus could be audited in entirety. Finally, this architecture reduced the likelihood of unauthorized data manipulation and ensured real-time validation of grant allocation and use of funds (Shaikh et al., 2025).

The local Ethereum-compatible blockchain environment designed to ensure the proposed grant disbursement framework is developed and evaluated based on Ganache, as shown in Figure 15. The interface shows system parameters such as block height, mining, gas configuration, and active accounts to enable a controlled test network to execute and monitor grant interactions of smart contracts.

FIGURE 15

Figure 16 demonstrates the real time block creation and transaction validation process in the Ganache environment. Grant-related smart contracts calls, such as the creation and validation of grants, plus the corresponding gas used, and transaction hash are stored in every block. This is how the irreversibility and traceability of grant transactions is established when they are attached to the blockchain.

FIGURE 16

In Figure 17, there is a web-based grant management interface which shows proposed grants that are stored in the blockchain. The interface provides an overview of grant identifiers, total and disbursed, addresses of transaction owners, and status of proposals so that authorized users can track the status of grant applications in a transparent and auditable format of proposal to validation.

FIGURE 17

3.12 Performance observation

The performance of the proposed framework is measured by the quantitative measures such as the results of transaction validation (accepted, rejected, in-progress), efficiency of gas consumption, and the behaviour of the transaction execution in the various simulation conditions.

Moreover, the main goal of this stage was to assess the effectiveness of the anti-corruption system in operations through the assessment of the accuracy of transaction approval and the pattern of disbursement and integrity of the system in the presence of simulated corruption events. The achievement was measured by comparing the amount of grants intended to be paid and the amount of money disbursed that is stored on chain. Furthermore, a difference of any kind caused the automatic rejection of the institutional authorities, which made sure that the transactions affecting corrupted transactions were marked in real time. Moreover, a comparison of the system with traditional manual grant management systems showed a high degree of improvement with regards to transparency, control, and traceability. Finally, the implementation of PoA governance enabled less gas consumption, efficient transaction processing, and accountability in institutional operations. These findings prove that the suggested system can implement corruption-resistant financial governance in the structure of the grants regime of the public sector.

Finally, compared to conventional systems of managing grants, where post audit validation and centralized record keeping are done, the proposed framework allows real-time validation, recording of transactions in an immutable manner and end-to-end traceability. In the traditional systems, anomalies are usually detected once the funds have been disbursed, but in the proposed system, anomalies are detected and discarded before the blockchain is committed. Moreover, the multi-level PoA validation increases accountability because the decision-making is distributed among institutional actors, which eliminates the possibility of unilateral manipulation. These differences indicate that there is an apparent enhancement of the structure of transparency, auditability, and corruption prevention capacity, as measured by the assessed simulation conditions.

3.13 Indicative gas costs of key actions

Table 1 (below) shows the estimated core smart contract operations in the proposed framework in terms of gas consumption. These values are a pointer of the possible financial overhead of making transactions on a public blockchain. It is necessary to mention that gas fees and ETHUSD exchange rates are constantly changing depending on the situation on the market and network overload (Shaikh et al., 2025). Consequently, the real execution expenses will be affected in different regions and with time. Real-time data of the Etherscan Gas Tracker was used to come up with the estimates discussed.

Formula:

Example:

The value of the transaction cost has been calculated using a gas price of 1 Gwei (1 Gwei = 10^–9 ETH) and an Ethereum market of USD 3,003.62 per ETH. The transaction costs are calculated as the conversion of the consumed gas in Gwei/ETH to ETH and multiplied by the current ETHUSD exchange rate. As an illustration, a 149,815 Gwei transaction delivers an approximate USD 0.45 cost, which proves the minimal cost of operation of the suggested blockchain-based system of grants disbursement.

4 Results and discussion

4.1 Results

The system evaluation outcomes (see Table 2) indicate that the proposed PoA-enabled anti-corruption framework is effective in enabling transparent and verifiable grant disbursements in the context of the public sector financial workflows. The goal of this stage was to test the precision with which the system authenticates transactions, the stability with which the system detects anomalies, and the level of consistency with which the system ensures the integrity of the disbursement process in simulated corruption cases. To accomplish this, the system was tested through matching the planned grant allocations with the actual disbursements that were registered on chain. Any deviation (either because of changed values, unauthorised redirection, or tampering) caused the validators (blockchain nodes) to reject it at once. The mechanism made sure that all corrupt or inconsistent transactions were identified in real time and prevented by blocking them systematically off the immutable ledger. The institutional authorities’ behaviour, in both instances, was a repetition of the dynamics of the real-world multi-level decision making, whereby the majority approval discourages unilateral manipulation and reduces the possibility of collusion. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the traditional manual grant management workflows versus the automated workflow demonstrated a great enhancement in transparency, traceability, and operational control. The blockchain-supported system provides real-time visibility, whereas traditional systems are frequently based on a post-event audit, and no such option is possible. In addition, the blockchain system ensures uninterrupted monitoring and provides inalienable data on each approval decision. Furthermore, PoA consensus minimized avoidable on-chain writing, leading to less gas usage and increased transaction processing speed, which is critical to scalability in government settings.

Figure 18 above presents the combined results of the validation of accepted, rejected and on-going grant transactions. The distribution shows how authorized grants have the similar validation path, whereas cases with rejected transactions are identical to those where simulated corruption or cases of mismatches were added. This distinct difference between valid and invalid transactions ensures the strength of the PoA logic of detecting anomalies. Moreover, the in-progress category shows the investment in transactions that are yet to be evaluated by multi-signatures and will be used to understand how the framework can handle the staged approvals without exposing the system to premature release of funds.

FIGURE 18

It should be noted that these are the results obtained under the conditions of controlled simulation and they are supposed to prove the functional integrity of the offered framework rather than ensure the same performance in real-life applications.

4.2 Discussion and findings

This research study has shown that the implementation of a PoA-based blockchain system into the procedures of public grant disbursement and fundraising can essentially improve and enhance transparency, accountability, and corruption resistance. Furthermore, under controlled simulation conditions, the system could identify inconsistencies between the desired and actual disbursed amounts in the tested situations, which indicates uniformity in the detection of anomalous transactions. This reflects a structural advantage over traditional financial processes, where audits are typically conducted post hoc and fraudulent activity is often detected after irreversible impact (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Trading, 2025; Dogar, 2017; Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Garcia, 2021). The majority validation requirement did not have one decision-maker, the unilateral decision risk was minimized, and an enforcement mechanism was created that resembled practical public sector hierarchical control. This design reduced the chances of internal manipulation and collusion by ensuring that illegitimate grants are never stored in the blockchain ledger. Moreover, one of the main lessons that appeared during the assessment is that blockchain not only improves transparency but reinvents accountability within institutions by providing crypto-graphic proof of all decisions. Every PoA based approval or rejection is added to a permanent audit trail (see Figure 14). This allows oversight agencies to monitor in real-time, builds trust among people, and has the advantage of ensuring that financial flows cannot be reversed to cover up bad practices. Additionally, the hybrid storage architecture, where blockchain is utilized to store the records of critical, tamper-sensitive nature and MySQL is used to store metadata, reduce gas consumption and maintain immutability in the areas, where it was the most needed. This makes the model technically feasible and economically effective in large-scale governmental implementation.

Finally, these outcomes suggest that the proposed architecture can be a foundation of corruption-resistant financial governance, with applicability to the broader public sector, including sectors outside of the educational field, such as health, infrastructure, local government, and disaster-relief funding.

4.3 Limitation

Although the framework demonstrates significant potential, several limitations must be acknowledged. Firstly, the test was conducted on the basis of simulation data and test-network deployment (Ganache + ERC-20 environment). Although this method enabled controlled experimentation, in real-world settings of the public sector, datasets are much larger, the interoperability requirements across multiple institutions introduce additional complexities, and the user behaviours are unpredictable and might not be reflected by the simulation (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Trading, 2025; Dogar, 2017). Secondly, PoA mechanism depends on the integrity of the appointed authorities (Shaikh et al., 2025). Multi-signature validation minimizes individual misuse, but collusion between the group of validators is theoretically possible (Shaikh et al., 2025). To reduce this risk, it would be necessary to further decentralise or integrate external audit nodes or citizen-oversight nodes. Thirdly, the adoption of blockchain in the government sector relies on political goodwill, regulatory backing and organisational ability (Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Navadkar et al., 2018; Mohite and Acharya, 2018; Haneem et al., 2020). The process of changing legacy systems to blockchain-powered workflows can be associated with a lot of training, investment in infrastructure, and cultural shift in governmental institutions.

Additionally, the validation is based on a limited number of simulated transactions (n = 7), which may not fully represent the complexity of real-world financial systems (see Figure 18). The next step in the work is going to be on large-scale datasets and real-world deployment to further validate it.

Finally, Ethereum networks have changing gas costs and transaction charges. Even though hybrid storage greatly lessens the on-chain operations, cost sensitivity is a notable factor to take into account upon implementation at the production scale (Zarir et al., 2021).

5 Ethical considerations

The system proposed directly assists in ethical, financial governance, as it imbues public fund management with transparency, auditability, and accountability. The architecture will minimise the chances of corruption, protect state funds, and strengthen institutional integrity by making every possible decision traceable and immutable. The adoption of blockchain in the government systems, however, brings ethical implications in regard to data control, digital inclusion, and equitable access (Ishengoma and Shao, 2025; Mustafa et al., 2025). Although blockchain is permanent, it is necessary to be careful not to store sensitive personal or institutional data on-chain (Rizal Batubara et al., 2019). To mitigate this, the above design has the disadvantage of confining blockchain storage to non-identifiable hashes and metadata of transactions, whereas sensitive data is contained in controlled local databases. Moreover, blockchain interfaces have to be easy to access by all stakeholders such as those with poor digital literacy so that they are not left out of participatory fundraising or grant-application procedures (Ishengoma and Shao, 2025; Mustafa et al., 2025; Muhdiarta, 2025). The need to deploy ethically therefore demands a user-oriented design, an inclusive access architecture, and an open governance policy (Mustafa et al., 2025; Rizal Batubara et al., 2019; Friday et al., 2023). Furthermore, the ethical responsibility is also an issue of the validation role of the authorities in PoA models: validators should be working under well-defined codes of conduct, under the law, with anti-collusion protection in place in order to make certain that digital authority is not abused (Ishengoma and Shao, 2025; Mustafa et al., 2025).

In general, this framework encourages ethical governance in principle, yet the achievement of effective real-world enforcement necessitates robust regulatory consistency, data privacy protection, and a desire to participate fairly.

6 Conclusion and future work

This paper introduces an anti-corruption architecture based on blockchain, which combines open fundraising, regulated grant disbursing, automation of smart-contracts, and consensus-based validation through PoA. The findings (see Figure 14) indicate that the system is efficient in avoiding unauthorized disbursement, identifying mismatches in real-time, and maintaining complete traceability of financial flows throughout the public institutions. The framework has a robust alternative to the traditional centralized financial management systems by using unchangeable ledger records and approval by distributed authorities.

Additionally, future research will be dedicated to the scaling of architecture to be deployed in a variety of areas of the public sector, such as health service procurement, national scholarship funds, emergency relief disbursements, and local government financial operations. Increasing the authorities in the PoA network, incorporating advanced anomaly detection with AI/ML models, and introducing mobile-first citizen interfaces are predicted to increase the network accessibility and openness even more (Shaikh and Khan, 2023; Trading, 2025; Dogar, 2017; Kim and Kang, 2021; Luciano et al., 2020; Aggarwal and Floridi, 2018; Garcia, 2021). Also, practical pilot applications to governmental organizations would enable testing under operational conditions, confirming regulatory compliance, compliance with the public, and scalability limitations.

Finally, the proposed architecture will be a preliminary move toward developing corruption-resistant, technologically sound, and citizen-trust-based governance infrastructures in the contemporary public sectors.

Although the suggested framework shows a good potential in the simulated conditions, it would be necessary to conduct additional validation based on the real-world data and deployment environments to get full consideration of the practical applicability and scalability of the proposed framework.

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